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In 1743, when Benjamin Franklin announced the formation of an American Philosophical Society for the Promotion of Useful Knowledge, it was important for the citizens of Pennsylvania to know 
more about their American Indian neighbors. Beyond a slice of land 
around Philadelphia, three quarters of the province were still occupied 
by the Delaware and several other Indian tribes, loosely gathered under 
the wing of an Indian confederacy known as the Six Nations. Relations 
with the Six Nations and their allies were being peacefully conducted in 
a series of so-called “Indian Treaties” that dealt with the fur trade, threats 
of war with France, settlement of grievances, and the purchase of land.
Franklin’s Treaties
Franklin played an important part in Indian affairs in colonial and 
early federal America, particularly with regard to Indian treaties. The 
minutes of 13 of these treaties, from 1736 to 1762, amounting to about 
300 pages, were printed in folio by Benjamin Franklin’s press. A 
magnicent volume of facsimile reproductions under the title Indian 
Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin was issued in 1938 by the 
a  Read on 8 November 2014 by Martin Levitt.
b  Anthony F. C. Wallace died on 5 October 2015.
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Historical Society of Pennsylvania, using copies of the treaties provided 
by several institutions, including the American Philosophical Society, 
which held the largest number. It was edited by Julian P. Boyd, who 
would become the rst editor of the papers of Thomas Jefferson and 
later President of the Society (1973–6). These treaty pamphlets might 
be regarded as the rst items acquired for the ethnological collections 
of the Society. They are the 18th century equivalents of 21st century 
videotapes, capturing, as Carl Van Doren, Pulitzer-prize winning author 
of the classic biography of Franklin and also a member of the Philo-
sophical Society, observed in his appreciation of the treaties as a literary 
genre, the reality of live events in a bygone age. Franklin remarked 
more pragmatically that the treaties should be of public interest because 
they showed “the method of doing business with these barbarians.”1
I have a vision of the rst Indian treaty in which, however, it is the 
English who are the barbarians. I see a group of Indians, standing on 
the shore of what we now know as the Atlantic Ocean, staring east-
ward at some Unidentied Floating Objects (UFOs) rising up from the 
waters that surround the world. These vessels come closer and disgorge 
small boats, and from them strange human beings land, with hairy 
faces and funny clothes, speaking to each other in an incomprehensible 
language. What to do with these aliens? Let’s light a re and sit down 
and try to talk with them and somehow nd out who they are and 
what they are doing here. So they gather around a council re and the 
Indian spokesman says calmly, in Mohawk, “We are Haudenosaunee. 
What is your Nation? Perhaps we are Cousins.” The White Captain 
stands up, stabs his sword into the sand, and yells into the sky, in 
English, “I claim this land in the name of His Christian Majesty, King 
James.” Then he turns to the Indian speaker and says, “Who’s in charge 
around here?” This was a meeting between an egalitarian society based 
on kinship and a hierarchical society based on authority. As time went 
on, there were more and more close encounters between the British 
visitors and the Six Nations, sometimes friendly, sometimes not, and 
both sides realized that there had to be a better way to communicate. 
The “treaty” was the mode in which the Indians and the Europeans 
learned to talk to each other.
Protocol
By Franklin’s time, a treaty protocol had been developed that both 
sides generally accepted. This protocol was based on the British deni-
tion of Indian tribes as sovereign nations governed by central councils 
of chiefs. The concept of “Indian nation” was the most critical, and 
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ultimately the most vulnerable, element of the protocol. Indispensable 
also were the use of bilingual interpreters and a mutually respectful 
sharing of diplomatic etiquettes. Shared protocol made possible agree-
ments on substantive issues, including the highly protable fur trade; 
the settlement of grievances; the purchase of Indian land; and, as 
always, the rming up of the indispensable alliance between the Six 
Nations and the British colonies in the persistent conict with the 
French in Canada.2 Pennsylvania’s version of treaty protocol was 
derived from mid-17th century New York, which on behalf of all the 
British colonies treated exclusively with the Six Nations Confederacy 
and, through that body, their tributary nations. It was Iroquois custom 
that shaped the proceedings in conformity with their traditional 
manner of conducting “publick Transactions with other Nations.”3
Printing the Indian treaty of 1736, and subsequent Pennsylvania 
treaties, was a public service of Franklin’s, attendant upon his service 
as clerk and, after 1751, as a member of the provincial Assembly. The 
developing confrontation between French and English interests in the 
Ohio country directed public attention to the need to better understand 
the government of the Six Nations. Franklin’s Treaties were, in their 
time, the most extensive presentation in English of Iroquois political 
practices and no doubt served as a guide to protocol for colonial 
ofcials engaged in Indian affairs. After the Lancaster Treaty of 1744, 
which was required to settle a bloody skirmish between Iroquois 
warriors and Virginia frontiersmen before a general frontier war broke 
out, Thomas Lee of Virginia wrote to Conrad Weiser, the Pennsylvania 
interpreter asking for background information about the Iroquois. 
Weiser’s correspondence with Lee, outlining Iroquois customs in 
religion, war, and marriage were published in part in Virginia and in 
Pennsylvania by a German language newspaper. Weiser’s sketches of 
Iroquois ethnology came to the attention of Benjamin Franklin, who 
published an excerpt. But Weiser’s account of the structure and 
procedures of the Confederacy was brief.
And there was not much else yet in print, except for Franklin’s 
Treaties, in the way of useful knowledge. A friend and associate of 
Franklin’s, Lewis Evans, published several reasonably accurate maps of 
Indian tribal locations in the British colonies, accompanied by a survey 
of the province of Pennsylvania that contained some information on 
Indians. The details were probably provided by Weiser and another 
Philadelphia scientist, John Bartram, who accompanied Weiser on trips 
to Indian country and later published a book on the subject. William 
Penn himself had published, as early as 1683, an account of the Indians 
of his province, but the description of political matters was limited to 
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treaties for the purchase of land from local Delaware (Lenni Lenape) 
“Kings.” Cadwallader Colden, an experienced Indian commissioner for 
New York, had published his celebrated History of the Five Nations of 
Indians in 1727, but it dealt mostly with the Iroquois wars with the 
French, and although it presented some treaty proceedings, it did not 
provide a cultural analysis of Iroquois polity. Franklin met Colden in 
New York in 1742 and included him as one of the early members of 
the Philosophical Society. No doubt Franklin learned more about the 
League of the Iroquois from Colden. An even earlier, and more sophis-
ticated, account of Iroquois kinship and political institutions had been 
published in Paris in 1709, written by Father Joseph-Francois Latau, 
a Jesuit missionary among the Mohawk. It was probably not accessible 
in Philadelphia in the middle of the 18th century and was not trans-
lated into English until William Fenton and Elizabeth Moore’s edition 
appeared in 1974–7. Thomas Jefferson picked up a copy during his 
tour as minister to France in the 1780’s following in the footsteps of 
Franklin. But Jefferson was unable to appreciate the sophisticated and 
intimate ethnography of kinship and council affairs, being distracted 
by Latau’s comparison of the American Indian egalitarian cultures 
with the democracy of ancient Greece. In replying to a letter from John 
Adams asking for a general book on the Indians, Jefferson dismissed 
Latau’s work in disparaging terms as being lled with “falsehoods” 
and “absurdities.” Jefferson’s own Notes on the State of Virginia (Paris 
1785) had much good to say about the Indians’ personal virtues but 
did not discuss the organization of the Confederacy. Franklin himself, 
while he was in France in the 1780’s, wrote a sketch of Indian manners 
and customs titled “Remarks Concerning the Savages of North 
America,” published in French (and English) for the salons of Paris. It 
depended in part on his treaty experiences and on conversations with 
Conrad Weiser.
These Indian treaties were public events usually held in White 
trading posts, forts, towns, and cities; they lasted for days, sometimes 
weeks, and were attended by hundreds of people, both White and 
Indian. (For instance, more than 500 Indians attended the treaty at 
Easton in 1758, and more than 2,000 attended at Fort Niagara in 1764). 
Indian visitors—men, women, and children—were housed in special 
dormitories. The delegations were led in person by the highest ofcials—
on the White side by representatives of the Crown, the governors, and 
superintendents of Indian affairs of the relevant colonies (later the terri-
tories of the United States); and on the Indian side by sachem chiefs 
from the Grand Council of the Six Nations and from chiefs’ councils of 
other nations and tribal factions. The treaty commonly began with a 
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formal evening, European-style, dinner, and the next day, a welcoming 
address was given by the host (if White, the Governor, if Indian, the 
Firekeeper). Both sides then performed a special ceremony of condo-
lence for their counterparts, taken from the Six Nations Condolence 
Ceremony for deceased chiefs. The bloody seats of the bereaved would 
be wiped clean, and the Three Bare Words of the Requickening Address 
were uttered (Eyes, Ears, and Throat), drying the mourners’ eyes of 
tears, opening the ears, and clearing the throat, so that they could see 
daylight again, hear speech, deliver words, and attend to business. The 
graves of the dead were symbolically covered with fur blankets or trade 
goods. There followed, day after day, alternating speeches by both sides, 
translated by interpreters, formally addressing the issues that brought 
them together. The interpreters probably did not provide simultaneous 
translation but rather verbal summaries of the speeches; such summa-
ries would be written down in English later.
Under the guidance of the interpreters, White spokesmen, like their 
Indian counterparts, repeatedly alluded to the enduring friendship of 
their nations, using the Iroquois metaphors of the Fire, the Road, and 
the Great Chain of Friendship. These metaphors were a formal termi-
nology that denoted abstract concepts. The Fire was the permanent 
council re, lit for the occasion by the party issuing the invitation, on 
either side of which the parties sat, peaceably reasoning with one 
another. The Road was the path of trade and communication between 
the two peoples, often beset by all sorts of impediments: rocks and 
fallen trees, noisy birds in the bushes spreading vile rumors, the bodies 
of innocent travelers killed by bad men. The Great Chain of Friendship 
tied together the Six Nations and the English colonies (acting always in 
the name of the British Crown) in trade and in defense against aggres-
sion by the French and their Indian allies, a chain, however, that if 
neglected was subject to rust, calling for efforts to polish and brighten 
the Chain in treaties that renewed old agreements and joined old 
friends together with new partners in a changing world. When a White 
speaker had concluded his message, the Indians often requested 
permission to delay their response until the following day so their 
councils of chiefs and clan mothers could discuss the White man’s 
words and formulate their own, collective answer. Signicant points 
were emphasized by the delivery of wampum by both sides: sometimes 
single strings of tubular shell beads were presented, or, accompanying 
major pronouncements, large belts woven of wampum strings, several 
feet long, bearing gurative designs of humans and animals or abstract 
metaphors such as the Two Row wampum belt. Dozens of these belts 
and strings could be presented by the speakers in any one treaty. These 
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exchanges of wampum served as evidence of the sincerity of the speaker, 
and the importance of the subject (such as agreement to a military alli-
ance or a cession of land), and as a physical record of the transaction, 
comparable to the White man’s written documents. The Indian nations 
preserved these strings and belts of wampum in a kind of ofcial 
archive, entrusted to a reliable person, and spokesmen were expected 
to visit these collections regularly to refresh their memories of interna-
tional events and commitments. Rum was not allowed during these 
days of formal meeting. The treaty would end with a ceremonial dinner, 
the presentation of trade goods, and, often, whiskey, as gifts or as 
payment for land ceded by the treaty.
The Franklin text of an Indian treaty essentially contained three 
elements: identication of participants; a narrative of events; and 
minutes of the exchange of speeches, wampum, and other Native 
memorials, and trade goods. The Native speeches were rendered into 
English, of course, from an edited fair copy of notes and recollections 
made by secretaries on the scene who listened to the translations and 
explanations of meaning provided by the “interpreters,” both White and 
Indian. Manuscript copies of some of these notes survive. The language 
of these speeches was brought to its often elegant nal form in many 
instances by the Penns’ agents Richard Peters and James Logan, who 
attended the treaties. Although errors and intentional omissions do blur 
the record, these minutes are supplemented and at times corrected in 
contemporaneous journals and correspondence of participants.
A central role in these proceedings was played by the person, or 
persons, identied in the minutes as “Interpreter.”4 Interpreters were 
men, occasionally women, who had learned the language and customs 
of the other side by living with members of the alien community as 
traders, often as a member of a family, over a period of years. Such 
individuals might have been sent as children to live in the other commu-
nity for the purpose of preparing them to serve as interpreters later on, 
as was the case with the famous Pennsylvania interpreter, Franklin’s 
friend, Conrad Weiser. Weiser’s parents were German immigrants who 
settled in New York before moving to the Pennsylvania-Dutch region 
and who boarded Conrad as a child with a Mohawk foster family so 
he could learn the Mohawk language. In addition to advising their 
principals on the protocol of treaties and translating their speeches, 
interpreters were needed to obviate, as best they could, various impedi-
ments to understanding. Internal politics and personal conicts lurked 
behind the scene, such that interpreters were needed to verify the legiti-
macy of representatives and ensure that invitations were issued to all 
the nations and colonies with an interest in treaty issue. What the 
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interpreters could not do was prevent the following three fatal aws, 
aws that brought about the end of the treaty system in 1871: (1) White 
manipulation of frontier conicts to coerce Indians to sell land in order 
to have peace; (2) the intrusion of fraud, misrepresentation, and incom-
petence during treaty proceedings; and (3) the failure of both sides to 
fulll commitments after the treaty because of an inability to control 
their own people.
Underlying these difculties was a fundamental difference between 
the Indian and European side, a difference of civilizations that was a 
potential source of misunderstanding in all treaty negotiations. This 
was the cultural divide between an Indigenous egalitarian society, in 
which mutual rights and duties were based on kinship, and a 
hierarchical society, in which mutual rights and duties were based on 
authority. There was a fundamental difference of civilizations. The 
difference lay in basic assumptions about society and the moral 
values—the ethos—that enabled it to function. Whites brought up in 
the European tradition saw human institutions as being naturally 
ordered in what has come to be called a “table of organization.” The 
Indians thought of society in terms of kinship.
The White schema is familiar as a chart depicting the administrative 
structure of all sorts of enduring enterprises, including centralized 
governments, standing armies, economic companies, schools, and 
religious denominations. At the top of the chart is a supreme authority 
(whether an individual or a group), and lines of command and control, 
duty and obedience, specialization and rank descend downward in the 
form of a pyramid, to a base-level of common citizen, enlisted man, 
unskilled laborer, parishioner, freshman, etc. Franklin himself had a 
penchant for designing the administrative structures of various institu-
tions that served the public welfare. Examples include the system of re 
companies in Philadelphia; the Pennsylvania Hospital; the Philadelphia 
College (later the University of Pennsylvania); a Philadelphia militia, the 
postal service of the northern colonies; and, to be discussed later, his 
1754 “Albany Plan of Union” of all the colonies, which anticipated the 
1787 Constitution of the United States. Although the table of organiza-
tion of even the smallest of these institutions required that somebody be 
in charge, participation was voluntary. In such a rank and le world, 
individual identity is one’s place in this hierarchy, signaled by a title indi-
cating rank (such as “President,” “General,” “Sergeant,” “Professor”) 
before one’s name and/or a sufx of initials indicating education and 
honors (“R.N.,” “Ph.D.,” “S.J.”). In the Franklin treaties, the ofcial 
White delegates are listed with titles and sufxes, such as “The Honorable 
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Proprietor Thomas Penn,” “Lieutenant-Governor George Thomas,” 
“Benjamin Franklin, Esq.,” “Conrad Weiser, Interpreter.”
From this vantage point, Native American political structure 
appeared to be extremely disjointed, as a result of the Indigenous ethos 
of freedom of individuals to choose their own course of conduct. 
Franklin’s friend Lewis Evans put the White view succinctly—there are 
no Indian Kings, no “monarchical Government:”
They are all Republicks in The strictest Sense; every Nation has a 
general Council, whither deputies are sent from every Village; & by 
a majority of Votes every Thing is determined there. What is most 
singular in American Government is no such thing as coercive 
power in any Nation: nor does the Government ever interfere 
between party & party: but let every one be judge & Executioner 
in his own Case. Tho the National Councils have Power of War & 
peace they can neither raise men nor appoint Ofcers: but leave it 
to such as of their own Accord united & chuse their own war 
Captain, nor has this Captain any Power to compel his Men, or to 
punish them for neglect of duty & yet no Ofcer on earth is more 
strictly obey’d, so strongly are they inuenced by The principle of 
doing their Duty uncompelled.
It is impossible not to digress from the subject of treaties and 
consider the dichotomy of triangle and circle more generally. I am 
reminded that the pyramid is a 3-dimensional triangle that as a symbol 
of national unity and progress has been depicted since 1782 on the 
Great Seal of the United States: an unnished pyramid of 13 steps, 
surmounted by the all-seeing Eye of Providence in a triangle at the top, 
with Latin inscriptions hailing the new order of the ages and invoking 
the blessing of the Almighty on the American enterprise. Its image 
appears today on the one-dollar bill. Franklin was chair of the rst 
committee to design the Great Seal. He introduced the concept of the 
omniscient Eye, conveying, perhaps, Franklin’s view of scientic 
knowledge as a guide in human affairs superior to government. But the 
nal design was prepared by William Barton and Charles Thomson 
(both members of the American Philosophical Society).
In treaty minutes, however, Indians are identied by name and only 
occasionally by a title, conferred by the White scribes, such as “Chief,” 
“Speaker,” or “Interpreter,” denoting their role in the conference as 
seen by the Whites, but not necessarily corresponding to any perma-
nent title in the Native community back home. A Western style of hier-
archical relationships was sparingly employed in northeastern Indian 
cultures and usually was temporary, as in the command-and-control 
how to buy a continent 259
structure of temporary war parties and the conduct of discussion and 
communication centered in “councils.” Group decisions, as in meetings 
of a Chiefs’ Council, required consensus and were rarely treated as 
binding on the women and warriors; they were regarded as recommen-
dations rather than as rule of law. For these Indians of the Northeast, 
each nation was and still is a kinship system, in which everyone is 
related to everyone else by links of consanguinity and afnity, and a 
table of organization for any institution or enterprise can be mapped 
onto the genealogical chart of this system. The genealogical chart is 
conceptualized not as a triangle, or a pyramid, but as a circle. As a 
tribal genealogist explained it to me rather forcefully, the genealogical 
chart of a clan is not a triangle as I visualized it, which implies hier-
archy, but a circle, which implies equality. The clan is an endless cycle 
of beings, each bearing a name belonging to the clan that is formally 
conferred on the young, coming from beneath the ground, living, and 
returning to earth, releasing the name. In effect, a circular, egalitarian 
kinship system, in which the rule is voluntary reciprocity rather than 
duty, is the table of organization.
Each of the Six Nations was composed of several matrilineal clans, 
each of which was named for an important species, such as Turtle, Bear, 
or Snipe. (White observers often referred to these clans by the word 
“tribe.”) With respect to clan, and therefore to membership in the 
nation, the rule was, “You are what your mother is.” The clans were 
exogamous, so that husbands and wives had to be of different clans. 
Each clan had a “clan-mother,” who nominated one or two male 
members of the clan to represent the clan for life in a council (the 
“chiefs’ council”). The council could deputize its own members, or 
other individuals of merit, to carry out missions, such as serving as 
“speaker” to represent the council’s views faithfully and elegantly in 
“treaties” with other nations. There was no king or supreme ruler.
The Six Nations conceived of the relations between nations in the 
same terms as relations between individuals within the nation, refer-
ring to each other by the same kinship terminology. Within the Six 
Nations, there were two moieties: the Elder Brothers (Mohawk, Onon-
daga, and Seneca) and the Younger Brothers (Oneida, Cayuga, and 
Tuscarora) In the case of a chief’s death, the grieving moiety would be 
condoled by the other, who would raise up a new chief as part of the 
Condolence Ceremony, the major ritual of the Confederacy. Nations 
afliated with the Confederacy addressed each other, and the Six 
Nations, by kinship terms, and the Six Nations referred to tributary 
members of the Confederacy as “Cousins,” and referred to (and 
addressed) the representatives of the European monarchies (French and 
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British) as “Father.” These terms all recognize some sort of positive 
relationship, but the ner meanings remain obscure. Father was a 
somewhat distant relationship because one’s biological father neces-
sarily (from the rule of clan exogamy) belonged to a different clan; 
one’s mother’s brother, Uncle, was more like a father in the European 
sense. Brothers were older and younger, the younger properly deferring 
to the elder. And English “cousins” were, in Iroquois usage, divided 
into “Brothers” and “Sisters” (parallel cousins, children of one’s 
mother’s sister, who was “Mother,” and father’s brother, who was 
“Father”) and into “Cousins” (cross-cousins, children of one’s mother’s 
brother and father’s sister) of different clans.
For patrilineally trained White negotiators, further complicating 
the concept of “chief” was the Iroquois rule of matrilineal succession. A 
man’s son could not succeed his father as chief in his father’s clan 
because he belonged to a different clan from his father; that father’s 
successor as chief could be his sister’s son, i.e. his maternal nephew, or 
another member of his own clan. But the Algonkian allies of the Six 
Nations in the Ohio Valley were patrilineal in reckoning descent, 
including clan membership; their kinship system was the opposite of 
the matrilineal Iroquois. At Carlisle, for instance, the wife of the late 
Piankeshaw chief had to make a special appeal, through an Iroquois 
speaker, for the White people and the Six Nations to recognize her 
husband’s son as the future chief. Failure to pay attention to cultural 
differences in rule of consanguinity and afnity could lead to mistakes 
in recognizing the presence or lack of valid credentials of those claiming 
authority to represent their nations.
An even more troubling semantic problem was attached to the 
word “Chief.” White ofcials usually did not grasp the status of all the 
Indian participants in the treaty proceedings. Back home in Iroquoia, 
the equivalent of the English term “chief” was royaner. The Grand 
Council was composed of fty royaner, each of whom was the repre-
sentative of a particular clan. Once the antlers of ofce had been placed 
on the Chief’s head, he inherited a name that had been held by all 
previous representatives and would be held by his successors and thus 
was, in effect, a title for that position. The royaner were nominated by 
the clan mothers of their respective clans. These were the true chiefs. 
They could, and did, however, put forward men of merit as speakers, 
head warriors, and men to do business, who might play an important 
role at treaties but were not authorized to make binding commitments, 
such as military alliances and cessions of land. The chiefs themselves, 
indeed, could not make such commitments individually, only when a 
group was authorized by a consensus of the council. Failure of White 
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ofcials to realize these constraints upon the delegates to a treaty could 
lead to cessions of land by unauthorized “chiefs” and to future land 
claims by embittered Indian descendants, claims that continue to this 
day. White negotiators wanted to nd the “King,” but in an egalitarian 
society, there is no “King” and the Speaker at a treaty could not commit 
all of the members of his own nation or the confederacy, let alone the 
sprawling alliance of the Ohio tribes, to the policy favored by the 
Grand Council at Onondaga. Council decisions within nations, and in 
the Grand Council, were reached by consensus, not a majority vote. 
The Council might reach a consensus to recommend peace with the 
Cherokees but a few bereaved family members might nevertheless 
initiate a “mourning war” to avenge a fellow clansman. White civiliza-
tions considered “factions,” whose members refused to obey a law or 
edict as binding, to be treasonous; Indians recognized that regional 
interests might impel a sub-group to travel a different path and exer-
cised forbearance.
The Doctrine of Discovery
Franklin’s publication of the Indian treaties was in itself an important 
event in development of relations between the Indian nations and the 
British colonies. In addition to giving information about Native American 
customs and values, these treaty minutes provided a model for the future 
conduct of negotiations, and particularly negotiations over the cession of 
land. They put forward the Pennsylvania system as the basis of the future 
policy for acquiring Indian land by the United States.
The Pennsylvania system recognized that the Crown had acquired an 
absolute sovereignty over its colonial territory by right of the Doctrine of 
Discovery. This sovereignty included not only political sovereignty but 
also ownership of the land, not only including eminent domain and 
mineral rights, but also the right of soil. When King James gave the prov-
ince of Pennsylvania to William Penn, the charter made no mention of 
Indian inhabitants or their rights. Penn chose to recognize a right of soil 
held by the Indians of Pennsylvania, an aboriginal title that could be 
conveyed not by war but only by purchase or other voluntary convey-
ance by the Indian owners. But what made the case of Pennsylvania 
unique was that the Penns, as Proprietors, chose not to delegate or sell 
the right to purchase to other White, British individuals or companies, 
but to become themselves the single purchaser of Indian lands. Prospec-
tive settlers then had to buy or lease land directly from the Penns. 
Furthermore, the Penns considered that the Indians had owned, and the 
Proprietors had bought, only surface rights. Mineral rights remained as 
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part of the proprietary estate and thus belonged to the State of Pennsyl-
vania, an issue of great importance in the next century after coal, iron, 
and oil became central to the state’s industrial economy.
The Pennsylvania model for acquiring Indian land stood in sharp 
contrast with the practice of other British colonies. To the north, in 
New York and Massachusetts, aboriginal title was recognized, but the 
right to purchase was given, or sold, to individuals and companies,who 
received a patent and then proceeded to buy a specied tract from 
Indian owners, sometimes in formal treaty, sometimes in private agree-
ments. To the south, at rst in Virginia, and later in other colonies, the 
initial assumption was that the Indians had no right of soil, purchase 
was not necessary, and land could be occupied by force or informal 
agreement. Further complicating inter-colonial differences was an over-
lapping of claims, the result of boundaries being set by different 
“discoverers” on behalf of the same or different kings. Virginia, for 
instance, laid claim to a vast swath of territory north of the Ohio River 
and west to the “South Sea” (Pacic Ocean). Pennsylvania’s grant had a 
specic western limit, but Connecticut claimed some of Pennsylvania’s 
land in the Susquehanna Valley. New York and Massachusetts both 
claimed the same land from the Hudson River to Lake Erie.
Competing with Britain in the rush to appropriate the Indian land 
of North America were France and Spain, who like Britain founded 
their territorial claims on the Doctrine of Discovery. In the years 1452, 
1454, and 1493, Popes Nicholas V and Alexander VI issued papal bulls 
that together form the original text of what has been called “the 
Doctrine of Discovery.” The age of expansion and exploration by the 
Christian nations of Europe was just beginning. Spain and Portugal 
were driving the Muslims (“Saracens”) out of the Iberian peninsula; 
trade with indel peoples in Africa and Asia was on the increase, in 
part because Genoese innovations in ship-building now made more 
extended ocean voyages possible. It was time to launch a new crusade, 
this one to recover the lands lost to the Moslems and go on to conquer 
the whole world for Christ.
The rst bull, Dum Diversas, was addressed to King Alfonso of 
Portugal:
We grant to you full and free power, through the Apostolic 
authority of this edict, to invade, conquer, ght, subjugate the 
Saracens and pagans and other indels and other enemies of Christ 
and wherever established their Kingdoms, Duchies, Royal Palaces, 
Principalities and other dominions . . . and any other possessions . . . 
and to lead their persons in perpetual servitude and to apply and 
appropriate realms, duchies, royal palaces, principalities, and other 
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dominions, possessions, or goods of this kind to you and your 
successors the kings of Portugal.
In the bull Romanus Pontifex 2 years later, the Pope extended to 
other “Catholic kings and princes” of Europe the same authority to 
invade and conquer non-Christian lands, reduce their inhabitants to 
slavery, and appropriate all their possessions to their own use. Restric-
tions on trade were imposed to prevent the pagan nations from 
acquiring European technology. And the King of Portugal was given 
exclusive rights to those lands that he had already acquired.
On the return of Columbus from the New World, the next Pope, 
Alexander VI, issued a bull, Inter Caetera, recognizing the rights of 
Ferdinand and Isabella to the lands that Columbus had discovered and 
granting Spain an exclusive charter to trade with or invade all lands 
100 leagues west of the Azores, the line to run from the Arctic to the 
Antarctic pole. (The Vatican knew the 1,000-year-old “Geography” of 
the Greek cartographer Claudius Ptolemy, who described the world as 
a sphere, measured by lines of latitude and longitude.) But Spain could 
not claim lands already appropriated by another Christian nation, thus 
establishing in international law (as construed by Christian Europeans) 
the same rights of exclusive sovereignty in the New World as applied to 
the same nations in Europe.
In effect, this Doctrine of Discovery meant that the captain of a 
ship could stab his sword into the sand of an unknown shore and 
declare in the name of God that a territory from sea to sea, any number 
of leagues north and south, now belonged to his king (but only so far 
as the land had not already been “discovered” by another captain 
working for another king). The declaration might have been merely a 
vacuous announcement, in a meaningless language, by beings from 
UFOs, to the native inhabitants of the territory, if it had not been 
followed by the landing of boatloads of Europeans carrying arms, 
establishing trading posts and forts, building villages and planting 
farms, and eventually driving the Indigenous people off their lands or 
forcing them to surrender to colonial authorities. The Doctrine of 
Discovery became the law of the land.
It is easy to read the Doctrine of Discovery as simply a license to 
greedy European monarchs to conquer and exploit the Indigenous 
peoples of the world. That it was. But it is important, in an inquiry into 
the ethnography of war, to understand how the popes, and the Catholic 
kings, perceived the circumstances of their time. Two major political 
processes were under way in the Mediterranean world of the 15th 
century: the Portuguese and Spanish inquisitions; and the rise of the 
Ottoman Empire.
264 anthony f. c. wallace
The Inquisition was part of the thrust to drive the Moors (Muslims) 
out of the Iberian peninsula and cleanse the region of Jews and other 
heretics. Many Jews and Moors had converted to Christianity, some of 
them occupying high places in church, the royal bureaucracy, and the 
banking industry, but their sincerity was often questioned. The Inquisi-
tion was managed by the kings, and apostasy was a political crime. 
While these indels were being expelled or burned at the stake, another, 
even more serious, threat to Christendom was growing along the 
eastern Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire was expanding by mili-
tary and diplomatic means out of Turkey into the Middle East, Egypt, 
and the Balkans. Constantinople, the center of the Eastern Orthodox 
branch of Christianity, fell to the Turks in 1453. Vienna itself was 
besieged in 1529 and 1532. And the Ottomans controlled the lucrative 
land trade routes to Asia.
From the standpoint of Pope Nicholas V, the fate of Christendom 
itself was threatened by the presence of Jews and Moors in Spain and 
Portugal; the Ottoman followers of Mohammed were enemies at the 
gates of European nations. Nicholas sought to revive the intellectual 
stature of Europe by supporting the new Renaissance humanism; he 
founded the Vatican Library. But he also sought to counter the economic, 
military, and religious power of the Islamic world by calling for a new 
Crusade against the Turks. And his encouragement of Portuguese and 
Spanish conquests of indel nations in Africa and India would bring the 
whole apparatus of the Church of Christ into the new lands.
But it is also clear that Nicholas envisaged that bypassing the old 
land routes to Asia would lead to the development of a world system of 
trade and commerce dominated by European powers. European nations 
would be able to use their own technological superiority to control 
world trade by control of the seas, breaking out beyond the 
Mediterranean into the Atlantic and Indian oceans. European navigators 
knew that the world was round and were aware of the measurable 
spaces of latitude and longitude. European ship builders employed new, 
superior methods of wooden sheathing; they were able to make long 
voyages out of sight of land. European armies had horses, cannons, 
wheeled carts, and iron and steel armor and swords, enabling a small 
force to overwhelm lightly armed resistance. The Pope was aware of the 
need to maintain technological superiority and the importance of with-
holding information and materials from the indels. The bull of 1454 
prohibited the sale of “iron instruments, wood to be used for construc-
tion, cordage, ships, or any kinds of armor” or the teaching of “the art 
of navigation, whereby they [those indels] would become more 
powerful . . .” The importance of this embargo on technological transfer 
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was so important that the Pope declared that violators would suffer, in 
addition to legal penalties, “the sentence of excommunication,” to be 
levied upon not only guilty individuals but whole communities.
Thus, in the following centuries, European trade and arms were able 
to overwhelm the entire regions of Africa, North and South America, 
and Australia, as well as India and much of southeast Asia, Indonesia, 
and Oceania. In the course of this economic and military conquest, and 
the accompanying ravages of disease and starvation, they were able to 
colonize not only hunters, gatherers, and village farmers, but also the 
sophisticated civilizations of Mexico, Central America, the Andes, North 
Africa, and India. The Doctrine of Discovery had been advanced to 
justify the military and economic colonization of most of the planet by 
European powers, including North America, South America, Africa, 
Australia, Indonesia, and Oceania, as well as most of Asia except China 
and Japan. The contemporary world system of core and peripheral 
nations was founded upon the Doctrine of Discovery.
Needless to say, the Indigenous peoples of the world have ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the Doctrine of Discovery. In the past two 
centuries, many of the colonies have won at least nominal indepen-
dence. A few years ago, the Indigenous movement, led in part by the 
Six Nations, achieved the passage, by the United Nations General 
Assembly, of a Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The 
late John Mohawk, a Seneca friend of mine, drafted the earliest version. 
I regret to say that the United States was one of only four countries to 
decline at rst to vote for the Declaration.
In Franklin’s time, the Doctrine of Discovery was interpreted differ-
ently by France and Spain from English practice. Neither nation recog-
nized Indian nations as having aboriginal title to their lands. From the 
outset, the Catholic monarchs assumed absolute unlimited title, 
including the underlying right of eminent domain, mineral rights below 
ground, and ownership of the soil in fee simple. In the case of Spain, 
the monarchs also assumed an obligation to save native souls by 
conversion to Catholicism and a duty to protect their Indian subjects 
from injury by Whites and other Indians by assigning them to what in 
effect were reservations (i.e., the encomienda system), governed by 
some combination of native and European administrators. France also 
assumed absolute title to Indian land, the recompense being conversion 
to Christian faith by the devoted Jesuit and other missionary orders. 
France, however, in contrast to French and English segregationist 
policies, welcomed Christian Indians as equal subjects of the Crown 
and encouraged biracial communities, The overlapping land claims of 
the European powers, and the different styles of racial interaction and 
266 anthony f. c. wallace
loyalty, set the stage for the diplomatic, trade, and military maneuverings 
that led to the French and Indian War.
The Albany Plan of Union
Anticipating the outbreak of open war (the “French and Indian War”), 
the colonies in 1754 joined in a conference at Albany to concert plans 
for the common defense against attack by Indian allies of the French. 
Franklin was becoming known as the Pennsylvania Assembly’s leading 
authority on Indian affairs and he was one of the delegates. He was 
chosen to prepare a draft of a proposal for a confederation of the 
colonies, the famous “Albany Plan of Union.” Franklin’s Plan recom-
mended a centralized government for the 13 colonies, with its own 
President and Grand Council (i.e., legislature), subject only to the 
authority of the Crown. He articulated these principles in some detail, 
utilizing his penchant for drawing up tables of organization. This 
central government should, using established treaty protocol, “make all 
purchases from the Indians for the crown of all lands not within the 
bounds of particular colonies,” obviating the chaos of different proce-
dures among the colonies, and should make all laws regulating Indian 
trade, including the sale of rum, which Franklin deplored, regarding it 
as a means of genocide. It provided that all of the English colonies 
recognize the Indian nations’ sovereignty and aboriginal title to their 
land, which could only be acquired by fair, open treaty according to the 
Pennsylvania protocol. Further, any purchases beyond the charter limits 
of the original colonies would be made by a single purchaser, the Union 
itself, on behalf of the Crown itself. After the Revolution, the Crown’s 
rights were transferred to the United States itself, which became the 
single purchaser on its own behalf. Although the Albany Plan of Union 
was not accepted by the 13 colonies or the Crown, the single purchaser 
principle became the governing concept later in provisions under the 
British Proclamation Line of 1763, the American Northwest Ordinance 
and the Articles of Confederation of 1784, and the Constitution after 
1787. His statement of a general policy for the acquiring of Indian 
lands in formal treaties by a single purchaser and for the regulation of 
the fur trade so as to cut off the destructive sale of rum was Franklin’s 
most important contribution to Indian affairs.5
These views were based in part on his admiration for the political 
wisdom of the Six Nations. He had in earlier years come to admire the 
Iroquois ability to form a union of disparate political entities. Perhaps 
he took to heart the admonition of the Onondaga speaker Canasetego, 
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who at Lancaster in 1744 (during a treaty printed by Franklin) 
counseled the colonies to form a union:
We have one Thing further to say, and that is, We heartily recommend 
Union and a good Agreement between you our Brethren. Never 
disagree, but preserve a strict Friendship for one another, and thereby 
you, as well as we, will become the stronger. Our wise Forefathers 
established Union and Amity between the Five Nations; this has 
made us formidable; this has given us great Weight and Authority 
with our neighbouring Nations. We are a powerful Confederacy; 
and, by your observing the same Methods our wise Forefathers have 
taken, you will acquire fresh Strength and Power; therefore whatever 
befalls you, never fall out with one another.
In a letter to a friend in 1751, Franklin later observed, “It would be a 
very strange thing if six nations of ignorant savages could be capable of 
forming such a union . . . and yet that a like union should be impracticable 
for ten or a dozen English colonies, to whom it is more necessary.”
The requirement that a single purchaser make all purchases of land 
from any Indian nation in future territories outside the existing colonies 
was the most signicant element of his Indian policy, and although not 
enacted into law at that time, it became the governing concept later in 
provisions under the Northwest Territory Ordinance and the application 
of the Constitution. The need for a single purchaser principle came from 
the chaotic mixture of existing practice. In New York, for example, indi-
vidual persons or company could approach Indians who seemed to 
occupy a desirable tract and buy the land from them, then carry the deed 
of sale to the governor, who issued a “patent” (in effect, a title). The 
possibility of malpractice in such an arrangement was obvious, not only 
fraud by White purchasers but irresponsibility by Indian sellers. Different 
White purchasers could easily obtain “title” to the same land by buying 
from different Indians. The Indians could be persuaded to sign while in a 
drunken stupor. In most such transactions, there was no formal treaty 
with legitimate members of the Council of the Indian nation. In Pennsyl-
vania, however, all purchases were made by the proprietors and private 
individuals, who later sold them to companies. But the proprietary agents 
preferred to buy from the Six Nations, attributing Indian title to the most 
powerful entity, but perhaps failing to satisfy the interests of the occu-
pants of the soil, as in the Walking Purchase. Furthermore, colonial char-
ters were sometimes loosely phrased, allowing for overlap in claims of 
the right to acquire land from the Indians. Thus, Connecticut claimed 
land in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts claimed land in New York, and 
Virginia claimed everything from the Appalachian Mountains to the 
Pacic Ocean.
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During the Indian treaty proceedings at Albany, Mohawk speakers 
complained about this unsatisfactory state of affairs. One bone of 
contention was the still-controversial “Kayaderossera Patent,” granted 
by Queen Anne in 1701 to a group of 10 speculators of 800,000 acres 
along the Hudson River in what is now Saratoga and adjoining 
counties. It was not surveyed, however, for 70 years, as a result of 
objections by the Mohawk, who claimed that the three Mohawks who 
“sold” the land were not authorized to do so. Although they were 
members of the three Mohawk clans (Turtle, Bear, and Wolf), each clan 
comprised several lineages, each of which was represented on the 
Mohawk Council by three sachems, and there were no records of the 
Council as a whole being consulted. A settlement with the Mohawk 
Nation was not concluded until 1761.
Franklin included under “Indian Trade” the need for a regulation 
of the destructive commerce in whiskey, which “through the bad 
conduct of traders who cheat the Indians after making them drunk” 
cost the existing colonies “great expence . . . in blood and treasure.” In 
this he reiterated the plea he and the other commissioners had made at 
Carlisle the year before. In his Autobiography, written decades later, he 
recollected the drunken orgy of the Indians, after the conclusion of that 
treaty (whose proceedings had been “orderly”), as a scene from Hell:
They [the Indians] were near one hundred men, women, and 
children, and were lodg’d in temporary cabins, built in the form of 
a square, just without the town. In the evening, hearing a great 
noise among them, the commissioners walk’d out to see what was 
the matter, We found that they had made a great bonre in the 
middle of the square; they were all drunk, men and women 
quarreling and ghting. Their dark-colour’d bodies, half naked, 
seen only by the gloomy light of the bonre, running and beating 
one another with rebrands, accompanied by their horrid yellings, 
form’d a scene the most resembling our ideas of hell that could 
well be imagined . . .
He added, “If it be the design of Providence to extirpate these 
savages in order to make room for cultivators of the soil, it seems not 
improbable that rum may be the appointed means.” Franklin was not a 
tee-totaling temperance man; he provided his troops with rum at 
Gnadenhuetten, but he believed in moderation in the use of alcohol for 
Whites as well as Indians. His condemnation of the whiskey trade in 
the Albany Plan was emphatic: “. . . they are supplyed with Rum by the 
traders in vast and almost incredible quantities… they often wound 
and murder one another in their Liquor, and to avoid Revenge ee to 
the French . . .”
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The principles of Franklin’s Indian policy grew out of a European 
Enlightenment view of world history. The basic elements of this 
perspective, as interpreted by British ofcials in Franklin’s time, were:
1. Natural law justies, and the idea of progress predicts, the replace-
ment of “savage” hunters and gatherers and village gardeners, who 
subsist on land that yields them a slender harvest, by agriculturists 
who farm intensively by advanced methods and thereby can 
support larger numbers of “civilized” people.
2. It is preferable, because it is more just and more economical, for 
civilized countries to acquire Indigenous land by peaceful means 
rather than by war.
3. Indigenous land is owned collectively by its aboriginal occupants, 
who are recognized as self-governing sovereign nations, that may 
sell land voluntarily.
4. Indigenous land may be sold only to a single purchaser (in the case 
of the English colonies, the Crown, and later the government of the 
United States).
5. The concept of “single purchaser” is derived from the 15th century 
papal Doctrine of Discovery, which gave exclusive rights of access 
to the rst Christian nation to “discover” a new land. 
6. Purchase must be done in formal treaties between sovereign 
nations, conducted without coercion or fraud, according to tradi-
tional protocol, combining both Indian and White diplomatic 
etiquette, as exemplied by the British-Six Nations treaties.6
The importance of Franklin’s Indian land cessions policy, as 
expressed in his Albany Plan, cannot be over-estimated, and the respect 
in which he was held as an authority on Indian affairs was widely 
recognized. At the outset of the Revolution, Franklin was a member of 
the First Continental Congress. In July 1775, the Congress established 
a committee to manage Indian affairs, consisting of three departments: 
one for the Six Nations, one for the Indians of the Ohio country, and 
one for the southern tribes. Benjamin Franklin and the jurist James 
Wilson represented Pennsylvania in Congress, Patrick Henry repre-
sented Virginia in the middle department, and Franklin served as the 
chairman of the whole Committee, earning him recognition, in the 21st 
century by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as their rst commissioner. 
Under Franklin’s leadership, the new Congress sought to win the Indian 
nations to their side, holding the Treaty of Fort Pitt to urge western 
allies of the Six Nations to remain neutral. At Albany, the Commis-
sioners in fulsome rhetoric called for peace and friendship between the 
Six Nations and the colonists, employing the Iroquois metaphor of the 
Confederacy’s universal tree of peace:
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Brothers! We live upon the same ground with you. The same island 
is our common birth-pace. We desire to sit down under the same 
tree of peace with you: let us water its roots and cherish its growth 
until the large leaves and ourishing branches shall extend to the 
setting sun and reach the skies.
Franklin did not remain long as Indian Committee chairman, 
however, sailing off to become minister to France a year later in 
October 1776. But in a partial adoption of Franklin’s “policies, the 
single purchaser principle had already become the governing concept in 
the provisions of the British Indian policy.
In a partial adoption of Franklin’s “single-purchaser” protocol, the 
Crown declared in 1763 the famous Proclamation Line. This 
Proclamation of 1763 prohibited the purchase of Indian lands west of 
the Appalachian Mountains and recognized the Indian right of soil. West 
of that line, title to Indian lands acquired by seizure, private purchase, or 
private purchase under provincial license (i.e., “patent”), would no 
longer be recognized as legal. Before any cession of land could be accom-
plished, a royal patent would have to be issued by the Crown or its 
agents (in the north, Sir William Johnson) and the purchase conrmed in 
a fair and open treaty. Despite much objection by colonists, the Procla-
mation and its revision at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix (1768), provided 
an opportunity for Benjamin Franklin and other notable colonial 
entrepreneurs (such as Washington and Patrick Henry) to secure royal 
patents and conduct purchases without the encumbrance of overlapping 
land claims from provinces such as Virginia and Pennsylvania.
From 1767 until 1775, Franklin associated himself with several such 
land speculations, seeking patent rights directly from the Crown to 
purchase (or validate previous purchases of) Indian land in the Ohio 
country. Franklin was for a time in England in the 1770s a prominent 
shareholder, among other powerful men, in an enterprise called the 
Grand Ohio Company that claimed to have assembled a vast estate in 
present Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky, originally purchased by the 
Illinois and Wabash land companies from various Indian tribes, 
amounting to nearly 90,000 square miles, approximately the size of 
Great Britain. The plan was to form a new Crown colony, to be named 
Vandalia, in honor of Caroline, queen-consort of George III, who was 
descended from the Germanic tribe that had conquered Rome. Although 
Franklin lobbied successfully before the Privy Council for its approval of 
a royal patent to recognize the validity of the purchase, the project lapsed 
during the Revolution. But it did not die. Citing forged documents, heirs 
of the old Wabash Company were able after 60 years to bring a claim of 
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ownership before the United States Supreme Court in the celebrated case 
of Johnson v. M’Intosh. In denying the Wabash claim, Chief Justice 
Marshall, as was noted, afrmed the single-purchaser principle and cited 
the Doctrine of Discovery as its source.7 
Indian Wars
After the failure of the Albany Plan, there followed a series of Indian 
wars. White negotiators were unable to accept native conceptions of 
nationhood and held to a persistent view of the Six Nations as an author-
itarian state that could be persuaded to coerce its tributaries to comply 
with British demands in matters of trade and alliance against the French. 
One case of the failure to understand the limits of Iroquois “imperial” 
power was the infamous Walking Purchase. Franklin’s enduring concern 
for preserving friendship with Pennsylvania’s Indians may have been 
awakened by that contentious issue, which ran throughout his series of 
published treaties. A Pennsylvania company headed by James Logan, the 
Penns’ agent in Indian affairs, planned to locate an iron furnace on land 
occupied by some Delaware Indians, land allegedly purchased long 
before in an obscure 17th century treaty, the original copy of which had 
unfortunately been lost. A Delaware occupant protested, claiming that 
no such sale had been made and that he had inherited the tract from his 
father. The land was surveyed by White speed walkers covering more 
ground in the specied “day and a half” than the Indians said had been 
intended. A Six Nations speaker, solicited by the Penns, expounded the 
Iroquois concept of land tenure as ownership by the nation as a whole 
and asserted that the Six Nations had acquired an underlying ownership 
to the land in question by conquest. Canasatego denounced their 
“cousins” the Delaware, who had occupancy rights but should have 
included the Six Nations when they ceded the tract, and who anyway did 
not really have a central council re of their own and were “women,” 
cousins who could not sell land.8
The Walking Purchase issue and related Delaware grievances even-
tually embroiled Franklin in military combat. In 1751, he was elected 
to a seat in the Pennsylvania Assembly. Here he identied himself with 
the anti-proprietary party, which opposed the Penn family in England, 
who refused to pay taxes on the vast proprietary estates. This “Quaker” 
party blamed the alienation of the Delaware Indians on the fraudulent 
Walking Purchase, which allegedly was contributing to the migration 
of many Delaware to the upper Susquehanna valley at Wyoming, as 
ordered by Canasetego, and to the defection of some to the French 
interest in the looming war. Thomson, a signer of the Declaration of 
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Independence, Secretary of the Continental Congress from 1774 to 
1789, and a hot patriot, had been a close friend of Franklin’s in Indian 
affairs. He and Franklin were leaders in the anti-proprietary party in 
Pennsylvania during the era of the French and Indian War. Thomson in 
particular had taken up the cause of the Delaware in blaming the 
proprietary for the outbreak of violence on the frontier. He served as 
secretary and advisor to the Delaware “chief” Teedyuscung at the treaty 
at Easton in 1758 (printed and probably attended by Franklin). In 
1759, he published a celebrated book, The Causes of the Alienation of 
the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British Interest, which 
blamed the proprietors and their Walking Purchase. Although histo-
rians, including myself, have discounted Thomson’s argument that the 
Walking Purchase was the primary cause of the alienation, the event 
serves to represent the pattern of Indian grievances over the loss of 
their land to greedy speculators and hostile settlers.
After Braddock’s defeat in July 1755, the Pennsylvania frontier 
came under attack. In November 1755, hostile warriors assaulted the 
Moravian community of Gnadenhuetten, a cooperative venture of 
White Moravian and Christian Delaware farm families, killing at least 
10 Whites and putting the Indian converts to ight. This community 
had been located at the northwest corner of the Walking Purchase, up 
the Lehigh River from Bethlehem, where the main Moravian town in 
the Purchase had been placed in 1743. In anticipation of such attacks, 
Franklin had written an act, passed by the Assembly, for the creation of 
a Pennsylvania militia regiment to defend the frontiers. He detailed the 
organization of the unit and accepted a commission as Colonel in 
command. With 560 volunteer soldiers, he marched north in January 
1756 to Gnadenhuetten to begin the building of a line of forts. After 
burying the dead settlers, his troops constructed the palisades and ring 
platforms of four such forts.9
A frequent breach of treaty agreements was caused by the inability 
of colonial and, later, the federal government to prevent outbreaks of 
violence against Indians by frontier Whites. An egregious example that 
also involved Franklin was the Conestoga massacre. A mob of “Paxton 
boys” slaughtered several peaceful, Christian, Indian families living at 
Lancaster near the Susquehanna River in accordance with 
understandings with the Six Nations, their “uncle.” This event occurred 
in December 1763, near the end of the Pontiac Rebellion. Then a mob 
of Paxton boys and their supporters marched on Philadelphia to 
confront the allegedly “pro-Indian” government of the province and 
murder a community of Christian Indians from the Moravian settle-
ments at Bethlehem seeking refuge in the city. They were only stopped 
by British troops and local militiamen, including Franklin, again 
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carrying a gun. He had already published a pamphlet condemning the 
massacre, asking, “If an Indian injures me, does it follow that I may 
revenge that injury on all Indians?” Ten years later, the famous Logan 
“the Great Mingo,” a former neighbor of the Conestoga, took his own 
revenge for that massacre and the murder of his kinfolk in Lord 
Dunmore’s War, the rst of a series of wars for control of Indian land 
in the Ohio country, which did not end until after the War of 1812. 
Jefferson immortalized the events leading to Lord Dunmore’s War in 
his publication of “Logan’s Lament.”
During the wars for the Northwest Territory, the United States 
sought to dissuade the Six Nations from supporting the Western 
Confederacy. This diplomatic effort led to the landmark Treaty of 
Canandaigua in 1794, negotiated by Timothy Pickering (who the 
following year was elected to membership in the American Philosophical 
Society). In this treaty, The United States recognized the Six Nations as 
a sovereign political entity that held aboriginal title to its lands in New 
York State. When and if the Six Nations freely chose to sell land, the 
United States would be the sole and only purchaser. A perpetual friend-
ship between the two nations was established. The Canandaigua Treaty 
put into effect the principles that Benjamin Franklin had articulated at 
Albany 40 years before.
Buying the Northwest Territory
It was not until 1795 that a comprehensive peace was accomplished at 
the landmark Treaty of Greenville, which extended the provisions of 
the Canandaigua agreement to the nations west of the Appalachians. 
This treaty observed some of the orderly, mutually respectful protocol 
of Franklin’s treaties, including an exchange of condolences for slain 
warriors. A line of property was drawn between Lake Erie and the 
Ohio River, west of which lay Indian land, encompassing the rest of the 
Northwest Territory (today’s Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Wisconsin). The language of the treaty recognized Indian ownership of 
land, declared the United States to be the exclusive purchaser when 
Indians wished to sell, and committed the United States to be the 
protector of the Indians, promising that the U.S. government would 
hear Indian complaints and see that justice was done:
The Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are quietly to 
enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they 
please, without any molestation from the United States; but when 
those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or 
any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States . . . .  
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And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be under 
the protection of the United States and no other power 
whatsoever.10
Attorneys bringing land claims cases before the Indian Claims 
Commission in the 1950s relied on Greenville and the Trade and Inter-
course Acts as the laws under which to sue the United States for failing 
to protect the Indian nations, as their guardian, from injury in land 
cession treaties.
The Greenville treaty, making the United States the legal guardian 
of Indian interests, was the legal capstone of the post-Revolution Indian 
policy, based on principles agreed on by President George Washington 
and his Secretary of War, Henry Knox. These principles were articu-
lated in two measures, the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 and the 
system of federal trading posts, called “factories.” The Trade and Inter-
course Act of 1790 (and re-enacted in subsequent years) explicitly 
required that the purchase of Indian land be conducted “at some public 
treaty, held under the authority of the United States,” and carried out in 
a fair manner to ensure justice to the Indians. The factory system 
would, hopefully, prevent private traders from ooding the Indian 
country with alcohol. The factory system was opposed by traders and 
terminated in 1822. But the Trade and Intercourse Acts remained in 
place. Washington and Knox were implementing the same principles 
that Franklin had asserted in his Albany Plan of Union of 1754. And, 
needless to say, both Washington and Knox were members of the 
American Philosophical Society.
For 50 years following Greenville, the United States pursued a 
steady policy of acquiring Indian land in the Northwest Territory, the 
South, and the Louisiana Purchase. The federally appointed Superin-
tendents of Indian Affairs (who were often the Governors) of each of 
the successive federal territories arranged the purchases. The rst goal 
was to usher the Indians to places west of the Mississippi, culminating 
in the Removal Act of 1830. By the 1840s, about one third of the terri-
tory of the present United States had been acquired in a series of trea-
ties. But in these treaties, there were two departures from pre-Revolution 
colonial protocol. Land would be purchased from individual Indian 
nations, not from confederacies. Thus at Fort Stanwix in 1784, peace 
was “given” to, and land was ceded by, the individual nations, not the 
Six Nations as a unit. After Greenville, treaties would not be held with 
the Northwest Confederacy but with the individual nations. There 
would no negotiations with the confederacy as the “single-seller.” And 
again unlike the colonial practice, the “Indian reservations” west of the 
Greenville line were not tracts chosen by the Indian owners and 
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reserved from sale, as was and still is the case with Six Nations reserves 
in New York, but rather parcels of public lands of the United States on 
which Indians agreed, or were assigned, to live, in some cases far from 
their original homelands.
Implementation and rationalization of this policy after Greenville 
fell into the hands of seven men. They were Thomas Jefferson, Vice 
President of the United States 1797–1801 and President 1801–9, and 
longtime President of the American Philosophical Society; William 
Henry Harrison (“Mr. Jefferson’s Hammer”), Governor of the North-
west Territory 1800–12 and later the Indiana territory, and President of 
the United States in 1841; Meriwether Lewis and William Clark 
(leaders of “The Corps of Discovery” of the Louisiana Purchase), 
Governors and Superintendents of Indian Affairs, Louisiana Territory, 
1806–38; Lewis Cass (“The Last Jeffersonian”), Secretary of War 
1831–36, and ethnologist Henry Schoolcraft, both Governors and 
Superintendents of Indian Affairs, Michigan Territory 1813–41; and 
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court until his death in 
1838, who afrmed the principle that the United States, not individual 
colonies, had acquired underlying title to any and all of the territories 
claimed by Great Britain south of Canada and thereby became the sole 
purchaser of Indian land, thus enshrining the Doctrine of Discovery 
into U.S. constitutional law. Four of these men joined Jefferson as 
members of the American Philosophical Society (Meriwether Lewis, 
Lewis Cass, Henry Schoolcraft, and John Marshall), and a fth 
(William Clark) was trained along with Lewis by members of the 
American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia in preparation for their 
exploration of the Louisiana Purchase. Clark’s journals of the expedi-
tion reside in the Society’s Library. Harrison’s father, from Virginia, was 
a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and young Harrison, 
before his military career and years as Governor of the Indiana Terri-
tory, had studied medicine in Philadelphia and lived with the family of 
Robert Morris, another member of the Philosophical Society and the 
purchaser of most of the remaining Seneca lands for the Holland Land 
Company at the Treaty of Big Tree in 1797. Harrison’s experience with 
Indian treaties began at Greenville as aide to the commander in chief, 
General Anthony Wayne, another APS member. It appears that the 
buying of America from the Indians was in considerable part concerted, 
up to the time of the Mexican War in 1848, by a group of men 
associated with the American Philosophical Society.
Two members of this group, in addition to Lewis and Clark, also 
played a part in the development, under Jefferson’s guidance, of the 
Society’s policy of encouraging systematic, planned research on American 
Indian languages and cultures and the collection of written records and 
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artifacts. Jefferson’s collection of vocabularies led to the work on Indian 
languages by two early members: John Heckewelder, Moravian 
missionary to the Delaware, and Peter Stephen Du Ponceau, who helped 
launch comparative linguistics. Lewis Cass circulated a formal question-
naire on Indian customs and history among well-informed persons in his 
Michigan Superintendency, and his protégé Henry Schoolcraft produced 
comprehensive works on the Indians, partly to provide information for 
the guidance of policy makers.11
The purchase of Indian land in the old Northwest Territory left a 
troubled legacy. Although the treaties of cession were ostensibly 
conducted according to protocol, they were often defective. Some 
treaties were held under coercion, Indian signatories were not always 
legitimate authorized representatives, tribes sold each other’s land, land 
changed occupants over the years resulting in duplicate purchases of 
the same tracts, boundaries were vaguely described before being 
surveyed, nancial details were misrepresented, and the language of 
crucial articles was often ambiguous and subject to differing interpreta-
tions. Misunderstanding of the 1804 treaty with the Sac and Fox even-
tually led to the Black Hawk War of 1832, in which the regular Army 
of the United States was mobilized to repel, and eventually destroy, an 
“invasion” by several hundred Sac men, women, and children seeking 
to re-occupy a village on the Rock River in Illinois that they believed 
still belonged to them. Indian complaints about these old treaties 
continued for generations, long after the tribes had been removed to 
the Indian Territory in Oklahoma.
In recognition of the service of so many American Indians in the 
armed services of the United States during World War II, in 1946 
Congress created an Indian Claims Commission to settle hundreds of 
civil suits against the United States. The Commission was not 
authorized to overturn the treaties themselves, which were statutes at 
law, but it could award nancial compensation on the ground that the 
United States as their legal guardian had failed to protect the interests 
of its Indian wards in cessions of land. A Joint Efforts Group of law 
rms representing plaintiffs originally from the old Northwest Terri-
tory (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin) was formed by 
Felix Cohen, author of the government’s Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law. I was employed in the 1950s by rms in the group to do 
ethno-historical research on the location of villages and hunting 
grounds, qualications of Indian signatories, and circumstances 
surrounding the treaties, and to testify before the Commission as an 
expert witness. My les on these cases are in the Society’s Library.
The Commission found that many of the Indian nations had been 
paid an “unconscionable consideration” for their lands. One of my 
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cases (Docket 83) involved the Sac and Fox cession of the northwestern 
third of Illinois, plus part of Wisconsin and Missouri north of St. Louis, 
at the questionable Black Hawk War treaty negotiated in 1804 by 
Harrison (who was pro-tem Governor of the Louisiana District while 
Lewis and Clark were still exploring the West). The Commission found 
that the United States had paid the Sac and Fox about one-half a cent 
per acre for land worth, on the market at that time, about 54 cents per 
acre. In 1973, 20 years after the Commission heard the case, the Sac 
and Fox were awarded nearly $2,000,000 for the difference in value in 
1804. Ination and 150 years’ worth of interest were not counted.12
The End of Treaties
By the 1840s in America, a transformation was occurring in popular 
sentiment regarding Indian affairs. No longer were policy and practice 
in the hands of Jeffersonian deists espousing the political philosophy of 
the Enlightenment. A new breed of public ofcial took charge, many of 
them military ofcers, responsive to the rising tide of evangelical Chris-
tianity, impatient with Indian treaties that became statutes binding on 
all citizens, willing to use military force to transform pagan hunters 
into Christian farmers. The old “single-purchaser” protocol was 
compromised in land cessions that specied the assignment of tracts of 
public land to railroad companies before the public had a chance to 
buy it from the government. After the annexation of Texas, California, 
and Mexican lands in the Southwest in the 1840s and the Civil War, in 
which some of the southern tribes fought for the Confederacy, there 
developed an endless round of Indian wars on the western frontier. 
Neither the United States nor the Sioux and other tribal groups were 
able to prevent their warriors from violating treaties that had estab-
lished boundaries after questionable cessions of land.
In this atmosphere of deep mistrust, the era of Indian treaties came 
to an end. In March 1871, Congress passed a law providing that “no 
treaties shall hereafter be negotiated with any Indian tribe within the 
United States as an independent nation or people.” There might indeed 
be consultations and “agreements,” but decisions about cessions of land, 
location of reservations, and tribal governance were thereafter made 
either by act of Congress or by executive order of the President.13 
It is an ironic twist of fate that this law ending the treaty period 
was passed while a Seneca Indian, Ely Parker, a sachem chief in the 
Grand Council of the Six Nations, held ofce as head of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. Parker had been a Union General during the Civil War 
and was General Grant’s aide during Lee’s surrender at Appomatox. 
Parker supported President Grant’s Peace Policy. He believed that to 
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avert extinction, the western Indians had to end armed resistance and 
adopt the White man’s ways, proposing the old plan, suggested in the 
1830s, of eventually admitting an Indian Territory as a state. To curb 
rampant corruption in the Indian service, he recommended that 
clergymen be appointed as agents in the eld. He even recommended 
ending the treaty system, viewing it as inappropriate to the actual situ-
ation, in which the Indians were no longer sovereign nations with 
central governments but loosely organized tribes dependent for survival 
on the United States. But Christian zealots in Congress regarded Parker 
as an untrustworthy Indian, a barbarian, too tolerant of native religious 
beliefs, a member of the Masonic order. Parker, in an emergency situa-
tion, bent the rules in hastily purchasing food for starving Sioux. In 
retaliation, he was charged with misappropriation of funds and 
subjected to a Congressional investigation.
Parker can be thought of as a Native American Hamlet, prince of 
an indigenous Denmark that he sought to save, entangled in a web of 
intrigue and moral ambivalences. On the one hand, he favored the 
peace-and-civilization vision of the Indians’ future, even if it had to be 
supported by military force; he himself had served in an army fought 
against Indians in the west. He criticized the current perverted practice 
of Indian treaties, observing that recent treaties often worked to the 
Indians’ disadvantage. The Indian tribes were not really sovereign, their 
chiefs’ councils lacking the power to enforce compliance on dissenting 
factions, whose forays simply led to massacres by the United States 
army. And the treaties themselves were “like the handle to a jug. The 
advantages and the power of execution are all on one side.”
No doubt the groundwork for this opinion had been formed by his 
experience with the Seneca treaties of Buffalo Creek of 1838 and 1842, 
in which a minority of chiefs and hangers-on, some made drunk, some 
bribed, had signed away all of the Seneca reservations in New York in 
exchange for promised lands in Kansas. As a result, the Seneca nation 
split in two, the Tonawanda band remaining a member of the 
Confederacy, and the southern reserves abandoning the system of clan 
chiefs for an electoral process. Parker, and his friend Morgan and 
Quaker allies, had lobbied in Washington to have the second treaty 
modied to save Tonawanda (whose chiefs had not signed the treaties). 
His own farm, managed by his sister Caroline, was not spared. Eventu-
ally the Tonawanda band was able to preserve a reduced reservation by 
buying land back from the Ogden Land Company with money obtained 
by abandoning claim to their trust land in Kansas.
More immediate crises must also have prompted his criticism of 
treaties. On taking ofce, he was confronted by reports of a massacre 
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of nearly 200 Piegan (Blackfoot) men, women, and children in a 
peaceful village. In the summer of 1869, he invited the Sioux chief 
Spotted Tail to meet with the president in Washington. Spotted Tail 
rejected the Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868), in which the United States 
purchased (or so it claimed) a large swath of Sioux territory in return 
for a reservation along the Missouri River. Spotted Tail asserted that 
the treaty document was a forgery and that the Sioux had not accepted 
such a reservation. The Sioux wars, symbolized in history by Custer’s 
“Last Stand” (1876) and the massacre at Wounded Knee (1890), were 
an outcome of the collapse of the old treaty protocol.
Assailed by racist enemies in Washington, threatened with death by 
Seneca traditionalists, and exhausted by days of Congressional testi-
mony, Parker suffered a medical crisis and was bed-ridden for weeks. 
Although Congress exonerated him, he resigned his post in August 1871, 
6 months after the anti-treaty law was passed. He left public life, lived on 
in straitened circumstances, and was buried in prestigious Forest Lawn 
Cemetery in Buffalo, next to Red Jacket. He lies on land torn from the 
Seneca by the infamous Treaty of Buffalo Creek, which in his youth he 
had fought to overturn. Some of Parker’s papers, including a draft of his 
letter of resignation, now rest in the Society’s Library.14
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